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insurers drew a dissent by two of the Justices who felt that a
good faith effort had been made to settle the claim. The case
will warn any insurer not to urge arson as a defense and then
make no effort to prove it.
In LeBreton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.,6 an insured, a naval
reserve officer, while on an authorized flight as part of his crosscountry training, was killed when the plane crashed. The claimant's effort to establish that the deceased was not at the time a
"member of the crew" so as to avoid the application of a provision
limiting coverage, was found without merit by the court in a
well-reasoned opinion.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Paul M. Hebert*
Fidelity National Bank of Baton Rouge v. Vucil was an important decision clarifying the legal remedy available to an
endorsee bank which cashes a check for a customer who has taken
the check under a forged or unauthorized endorsement. Six
checks drawn on out-of-state banks were remitted by the drawers
to the payee in settlement of various invoices. An employee of
the payee forged the payee's endorsement and, without authority, cashed the checks with the defendant, a bookmaker. The
proceeds were lost in gambling at defendant's establishment
and no portion was received by the payee. The defendant endorsed each check, presented the same to the plaintiff bank and
the bank paid the sum represented by the checks to the defendant. The plaintiff bank was in good faith and knew nothing of
the circumstances that resulted in defendant's lack of title.
Under the usual guaranty of all prior endorsements, the checks
were duly forwarded to the six out-of-state drawee banks which,
upon presentation, paid the items and debited the account of
the drawers. When the forgery was discovered, each of the six
drawee banks made demand upon plaintiff bank for reimbursement under the guaranty of prior endorsements. The plaintiff
bank did not reimburse the drawee banks, but the checks were
relinquished to the plaintiff for the purpose of supporting the
bank's action against the defendant for recovery of the proceeds.
The court sustained the plaintiff bank's action on the theory of
6. 223 La. 984, 67 So.2d 565 (1953).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 224 La. 124, 68 So.2d 781 (1953).
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breach of warranty 2 by the defendant endorser and on the fur-

3
ther theory of recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact.

It was held that the plaintiff was not a "holder" of the checks
within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Law, but that
the demand made on the plaintiff for repayment by the drawee
banks coupled with plaintiff's clear liability to its endorsers constituted a sufficient interest in plaintiff to permit maintenance of
the suit.4 A dissenting opinion maintained that the plaintiff was

without interest to sue because reimbursement had not been
made by the plaintiff bank to the drawees.5
The practical result of the case is highly desirable and represents a commendable willingness of the court to look through
technicalities to the substance of the matter." Unquestionably,
under the circumstances, as the signature of the payee was forged
and unauthorized, the defendant as the party who had cashed
the check for the forger would ultimately bear the loss. 7 Def en-

dant, in effect, was insisting that there should be circuity of
action in arriving at that result or that the plaintiff bank should,
at least, have reimbursed the drawees prior to bringing the action.
Had the plaintiff bank in this case reimbursed the drawee banks
there could be no question of the right of the plaintiff bank to
maintain the action. The court's decision that the plaintiff bank
could not be a "holder" because of the forged endorsement of
the payee does not appear to be sound on the facts before the
court.8 As between the endorser who takes subsequent to the
forged endorsement and his endorsee, the latter literally complies
with the definition of "holder" as that term is used in the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 23 of the Negotiable Instru2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§

65, 66; LA. R.S. 7:65, 66 (1950).

3. Art. 2301, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.

4. Art. 15, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, provides that an action can only
be brought by one having a real and actual interest. The drawee banks had
actually made demand on the plaintiff for reimbursement and the plaintiff's
liability to the drawee banks was clear, assuming that the payee's endorsement was a forgery.
5. In Justice Hamiter's view, the plaintiff's interest to sue would arise
only when reimbursement was actually made. See dissenting opinion in
principal case, 224 La. 124, 135, 68 So.2d 781, 785 (1953). But this runs counter
to the whole theory of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which permits suits
by "holders" who are not the real party at interest. Cf. NIL § 51; LA. R.S.
7:51 (1950).
6. Justice Hawthorne in the majority opinion, 224 La. 124, 134, 68 So.2d
781, 784 (1953), stated: "We consider the defendant's contention unduly technical and one for the purposes of delay only, because there is absolutely no
question under the facts of this case of ultimate liability."
7. LA. R.S. 7:23 (1950).
8. NIL § 191; LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950) defines the "holder" as the payee or
the endorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof
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ments Law does not lead to a contrary result because under its
terms the forged endorsement is operative as against a person
who is precluded from asserting the forgery. The defendant as
a subsequent endorser was clearly precluded from asserting the
forgery of the payee's endorsement as a warrantor of the genuineness of prior endorsements. The result reached in the case
on the grounds of unjust enrichment and breach of warranty is
sound, but the plaintiff should likewise have been entitled to
recover as "holder" of the checks against its endorser who had
taken the checks from the party endorsing and negotiating
without authority.9
In General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Daigle10 the
court reached a highly undesirable result which may operate
to limit greatly the status of automobile finance companies as
holders in due course of chattel mortgage paper. Specifically, the
court held that the plaintiff finance company was charged with
knowledge of infirmities in the instrument taken by it on August
10, 1953, because (1) the title certificate showing the infirmity
(i.e., that car was a used car and not new as recited in the bill
of sale) was not issued until August 18, 1953, and that was the
date that the title to the car was marketable; (2) a purchaser of
a financing note is not a holder in due course until the whole
transaction is completed by issuance of the certificate of title;
(3) that, as of August 18, 1953, a comparison of the bill of sale
and mortgage papers with the title papers would have disclosed
the infirmity; and (4) because the finance company having previously financed the car for another purchaser had papers in its
possession which would have shown that the car was a used car
and not a new car as set forth in the bill of sale and chattel
mortgage. While the court disposed of the case on the factual
ground of finding "knowledge" or "notice" of the infirmity in
the instrument on the part of transferee, it nevertheless appears
that the case applies a standard of care which ignores the effect
of Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Law." The Certifi9. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 749, § 158, 661, § 142 (1943), relied upon by the
court does not contemplate a situation in which the endorser who is ultimately liable is the defendant in an action brought by his endorsee.
10. 225 La. 123, 72 So.2d 319 (1954).
11. NIL § 56; LA. R.S. 7:56 (1950) provides: "To constitute notice of an
infirmity In the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating
the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action
in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." This provision was intended to repudiate the minority common law rule that negligence amounted
to bad faith. For discussion, see BRrrTON, BILLS AND NOTES 407 et seq., § 100

(1943).
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cate of Title Act 12 should not be construed as limiting the concept
of negotiability, yet this is the net effect of the decision. Though
the legislature moved promptly to change the result of this
decision by passing Act 228 of 1954, it is doubtful that the statute
covers all of the broad implications of the Daigle case. 1 In applying the Certificate of Title Act to determine the plaintiff's
status as a holder in due course, the court gave that act aninterpretation that was probably never intended and, in fact, is
in conflict with the very purpose of the statute. 14 Certainly, there
was no actual knowledge of the transferee that there had been a
false representation as to the car being a new car. It is inconceivable that the transaction would have been financed had that
been known. Furthermore, to impose a duty to consult its own
records involving the same car in a previous transaction is unrealistic and unduly burdensome. 15 The failure to engage in such
an extraordinary procedure should not be classified as "bad
faith" on the part of a transferee. The instant case comes perilously close to the repudiated doctrine that negligence is bad
faith. The plaintiff purchased the note on August 10, 1954, without actual knowledge of any infirmity in the instrument and
should have been accorded the protection of a holder in due
course under Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.18
A clear distinction between the purchaser of the note and the
12. LA. R.S. 32:706 (1950).
13. La. Acts 1954, No. 228, amending LA. R.S. 32:706 (1950), added the
proviso to the original section "that neither the foregoing nor any other

provisions of this Vehicle Certificate of Title Law shall be construed to have
the effect of delaying, suspending, or preventing the negotiation of a note
secured by a chattel mortgage on a vehicle from being complete until the
purchaser shall have obtained a certificate of title to said vehicle, the actual
intention and effect of this law being that such chattel mortgages shall be
complete and effective as to all persons from the date of notation of same
by the commissioner on the face of the certificate of title for such vehicle,
or, in the case of mortgages given by automobile dealers to secure so-called
floor plan loans, from the time they are entered by the commissioner on the
register of the floor plan mortgages, all in accordance with the provisions
of R.S. 32:710 B." It is obvious that the statute was intended to overrule the
basic premise of the Daigle case, but the statute does not affect the imputed
notice the court found present as a matter of fact.
14. One of the very purposes of the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law Is
to furnish greater security to persons lending money on the security of
chattel mortgages on automobiles. It was never intended that the rights of
a transferee under the Negotiable Instruments Law are to be held in
abeyance, as it were, until the certificate of title was complete.
15. To require an automobile finance company at its peril to recall a
previous sale of the same automobile when a subsequent transaction involving the sale of the same car as a new car arises, is virtually to exact that
an index or filing system of serial and motor numbers be maintained for
such a limited purpose.
16. LA. R.S. 7:52 (1950).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XV

marketability of title to the automobile which secured the note
should have been drawn in this case. Had that been done, the
opposite result should have been reached and the lower court's
decision affirmed.

Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
Attempted Perjury
Article 27 of the Criminal Code1 covers an attempt to commit
any crime, and the penalty is fixed at one-half of that for the
intended offense. The elements of this inchoate crime are a
specific intent to commit the basic offense and the doing of an
act "tending directly toward the accomplishment of that object."
This offense embraces the conduct of one who is apprehended
while his criminal undertaking is still incomplete, or the situation where completion of the offense was rendered impossible
by some unknown circumstance.
In State v. Latiolais2 the defendant had been charged with
perjury, and a verdict of attempted perjury returned by the
jury.3 Defense counsel argued that there was no separate crime
of attempted perjury, since the basic perjury definition was so
broad that it covered the mere making of a false statement, with
intent to use it in a judicial or official proceeding. 4 Any act that
went beyond the zone of preparation, according to this reasoning, was either perjury or no crime at all. In overruling this
contention, Justice Hawthorne pointed out that an attempted
perjury verdict would be appropriate in a case where the completed crime was rendered impossible by some "extraneous circumstance," such as the fact that the one administering the false
oath was not authorized or qualified to administer it.r This situation is clearly embraced within the attempt article, which
specifically states that "it shall be immaterial whether, under
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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LA. R.S.
74 So.2d
LA. R.S.
LA. R.S.
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14:27 (1950).
148 (La. 1954).
15:406 (1950).
14:123 (1950).
148, 150 (La. 1954).

